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DNA's Dark Side
Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other Dispatches from the
Wrongly Convicted. By Jim Dwyer,* Peter Neufeld,** & Barry Scheck.***
New York: Doubleday, 2000. Pp. ix, 298. $24.95.
In 1932, Professor Edwin M. Borchard wrote in his classic study,
Convicting the Innocent, "In an age when social justice has made such
marked advances.., it seems strange that so little attention has been given
to one of the most flagrant of all publicly imposed wrongs-the plight of
the innocent victim of unjust conviction in criminal cases."' In the seven
decades since Professor Borchard's observation, the general cause of social
justice has surely been advanced as the New Deal of the 1930s and the
Great Society programs of the 1960s brought opportunity to previously
neglected classes of Americans. Yet over the same period-at least until
quite recently-the conviction of innocent individuals has remained a
neglected topic among both policymakers and scholars.
In the 1990s, the use of advanced DNA testing has freed many
wrongfully incarcerated persons.2 As a result, scholars3 and the media4 have
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1. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 375
(1932).
2. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE To ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996).
3. E.g., Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1998); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998); Michael L. Radelet et al., Prisoners
Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 COOLEY L. REV.
907 (1996); Marty I. Rosenbaum, Inevitable Error: Wrongful New York State Homicide
Convictions, 1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 807, 809 (1990-1991); Robert
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increasingly focused on the conviction of the innocent. It was only a matter
of time before the accumulated evidence of wrongful conviction
precipitated the first intervention by a political leader: Illinois Governor
George Ryan declared a moratorium on the death penalty in February 2000,
which is to last until he can say "with moral certainty" that all those
sentenced to death in Illinois were truly guilty.5
Aimed at a popular audience, Actual Innocence: Five Days to
Execution and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted is sure to
raise consciousness regarding the problem of wrongful conviction.
Authored by "dream team" and longtime Legal Aid lawyers Peter Neufeld
and Barry Scheck, along with journalist Jim Dwyer, the book emerged from
Neufeld's and Scheck's work on behalf of the Innocence Project of the
Cardozo Law School at Brooklyn's Yeshiva University, where Scheck
teaches in the clinical program. Along with Cardozo law students, the two
authors have worked to right unjust convictions using a combination of
ultramodern science and old-fashioned lawyering.
The book is in part a selection of case studies of some of the sixty-
seven people proven innocent by DNA as of August 1999 (p. xiv). I argue
that there is a dark side to the authors' focus on DNA, but I do not mean to
detract from the force of the anecdotes they relate:6 Ron Williamson and
Dennis Fritz, imprisoned for twelve years and very nearly executed in
Oklahoma for a murder they did not commit (pp. 144-56); Robert Miller,
sentenced to death in Oklahoma for a rape and murder he did not commit
(pp. 95-106); Marion Coakley, wrongfully imprisoned in New York for
rape and robbery (pp. 11-34); Walter Snyder, wrongfully imprisoned for
seven years for rape (pp. 37-77); Kirk Bloodsworth, sentenced to die for a
rape and murder he did not commit (pp. 213-22); Kirk Grier, imprisoned for
fifteen years after being wrongfully convicted of beating his wife and
slaying his unborn child (pp. 239-44). These stories should be of significant
interest to scholars, practitioners, and law students. They make the
otherwise cold words of opinions and articles come to life.
Rosenthal, State of New Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels: An Overview, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 246 (1995).
4. E.g., Jeffrey Bils & Ken Armstrong, Rockford Judge Gets Cruz Case, Former Prosecutor
Surrenders, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1996, at 1; Mark Hansen, How a Vision Failed: Indictment Calls
Prosecution a Conspiracy Against Suspect, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at 26; David Howard, New
Mission: Recording Police Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at 7; Joseph P. Shapiro,
The Wrong Men on Death Row, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 9, 1988, at 22 ("For every
7 executions... I other prisoner on death row has been found innocent.").
5. Benjamin Soskis, Alive and Kicking: Why the Death Penalty's Not Going Away, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2000, at 26.
6. Avoiding wrongful conviction is not just about these poor souls. It is also a law-and-order
issue: When innocent people go to jail, the real killers or rapists are on the loose and free to break
the law anew (pp. 244-45).
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But the book sets out to do more than tell stories: Instead, it aims to
figure out "what went wrong," and "who did wrong," and to take account
of "the innocent person" (p. xvii). The heroes of this story are not the
wrongfully convicted-many of whom led difficult, troubled lives'-nor
even the author-lawyers themselves, whose "schmoozing, publicity and
cajoling" (p. 148) on behalf of the wrongfully convicted are downplayed. If
anything, the hero of this story is the DNA molecule.8 The authors devote
considerable space to describing the impact of DNA science on the art of
freeing the wrongly convicted (pp. 35-40). By providing virtually
unimpeachable evidence of innocence, "[t]he DNA era ha[s] shaken the
foundations of the system" (p. 248). Along the way, readers learn the
difference between RFLP (pp. 36, 40, 87), PCR (pp. 38, 40, 68, 87, 112),
and STR (p. 151) approaches to DNA testing. Readers also encounter a
number of prosecutors who resist the introduction of DNA evidence (pp.
93, 111, 206, 219), forcing the Innocence Project to fight "long, expensive,
and maddening battles" (p. 219).
The authors direct the bulk of their effort to explaining the dimensions
of the criminal justice system's tendency to convict the innocent. Twenty-
nine percent of the wrongful convictions studied by the Innocence Project
involved "hair analysis" (p. 166), a type of junk science (pp. 158-7 1) used
to convict the innocent, in spite of the fact that "[t]he weakness of the field
is well established" (p. 162).' In addition to junk science, outright phony
science played a role in a number of cases (pp. 109-25)." ° Eighty-four
percent of the wrongful convictions studied rested at least in part on faulty
witness identification (p. 73). Describing how mistaken eyewitness
testimony favors wrongful conviction, the authors cull anecdotes ranging
from a German professor's experiment in his 1902 psychology class (p. 41)
to an NBC broadcast from 1972 (p. 43). Misconduct by prosecutors and
police officers (such as concealing exonerating evidence from defense
7. In a particularly chilling chapter, the authors describe the intense difficulty the wrongfully
convicted face in starting anew (p. 223). Faced with massive impediments to civil recovery, only
37% of the wrongfully convicted are ever compensated (p. 229). The authors tell the story of
Marion Coakley, wrongfully imprisoned for rape and robbery, who won $460,000 in civil court,
but between his release and that victory, was poor and drunk and broke into a house, earning a
sentence of twenty years (p. 231).
8. Just a decade ago, the acronym "DNA" would have required a lengthy explanation. The
public has gained awareness of genetic science at a startling pace. See Paul B. Tyler, Fundamental
Misunderstandings About DNA Contamination: Does It Help or Hurt the Criminal Defendant?,
31 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 15, 15 (1996) ("Thanks in whole to the immense media coverage
of the OJ. Simpson case, the phrase 'DNA evidence' has become an all too familiar term. The
Simpson case has elicited debate over DNA amongst the general public that heretofore had been
limited to scientific circles, symposiums on scientific evidence, and the like.").
9. The authors also describe a dog handler who claimed his German shepherd could pick up
years-old scents and a forensic dentist who claimed to be able to see tooth marks and scratches,
otherwise invisible, by using a blue laser light and yellow goggles (p. 163).
10. "Sham has passed for science in criminal cases all over the United States, at times to
shocking effect" (p. 116).
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counsel) (pp. 172-82) played a role in a whopping 63% of the wrongful
convictions studied by the authors (p. 263). Incompetent or subpar legal
representation played a role in 27% of the wrongful convictions studied
(p. 187)." False confessions (pp. 78-108) played a role in 23% of the
wrongful convictions studied (p. 92). Jailhouse snitches 2 played a role in
21% of the cases studied (p. 263). The authors also argue that race (pp. 193-
210) " and the death penalty (p. 211) 4 played roles in wrongful conviction.
Significantly, these dimensions of the problem do not operate in
isolation, but rather reinforce one another so as to multiply the likelihood of
wrongful conviction for the most disadvantaged: "[C]riminal investigations
can become echo chambers, where answers are shaped by what people
believe ought to be true rather than what they know to be the facts"
(p. 114). For example, when confronted with junk science, a witness might
suddenly "remember" previously "forgotten" facts. A minority defendant
might also be more likely than a majority defendant to be poorly
represented.
The authors also canvass the literature on wrongful convictions (and
their own experiences in the field) to develop a comprehensive list of policy
proposals. These range from forming an administrative screening
committee to determine whether a jailhouse snitch should be allowed to
testify (pp. 256-57), to requiring prompt DNA testing for suspects (p. 255),
to mandating videotaping of all police interrogations (p. 256), to forming a
11,. The authors describe this problem under the chapter heading, "Sleeping Lawyers"
(pp. 183-92).
12. The authors imply that such snitches, motivated by bald self-interest, fabricate or
otherwise distort the truth.
13. This section of the book is a bit underdeveloped. The authors present statistics showing
how the criminal justice system differentially punishes minority men (pp. 203-04). That does not
prove that minority men are any more likely to be convicted while innocent. The authors' point is
supported by anecdotal evidence describing how black alibi witnesses are rejected in favor of
white identification witnesses (p. 209). If juries are racist, they might be blind to exculpatory facts
presented by black alibi witnesses. One should also not underestimate the role judges play,
through various jury-control mechanisms, in influencing jury perception of facts on racial
grounds. Cf John Tehranian, Note, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the
Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 819 (2000) (demonstrating how
judges can be just as susceptible to racial bias as juries).
14. Gruesome murders (those most likely to be capital crimes) receive the most public
attention, and as a result, "the barrier[s] to conviction drop... considerably" (p. 213). Jurors vote
for guilt "as a way to speak for [a victim's] life" (p. 213), and the weaknesses of a case are
"ignored in the backwash of emotion that follows a terrible killing" (p. 221). The authors hint at,
but do not explicitly mention, a second way the death penalty could lead to wrongful
imprisonment: by scaring some innocent suspects into confessing so as to avoid even a small
chance of capital punishment. For example, they tell the story of David Vasquez, a borderline
mentally retarded suspect who pled guilty to a crime he did not commit so as to avoid the death
penalty (p. 244). Recent empirical scholarship on the economics of crime has explored the link
between the death penalty and plea bargaining. See generally Ilyana M. Kuziemko, Does the
Death Penalty Lead to More Guilty Pleas in Murder Cases? (2000) (unpublished A.B. thesis,
Harvard University) (on file with the Harvard University Library).
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network of well-funded Innocence Projects at the nation's law schools
(p. 260).
While the authors do gather a wide array of policy prescriptions, 5 in
the end they concentrate on DNA evidence.' 6 None of the other proposals
the authors make provide as clear-cut evidence of an individual's wrongful
conviction as exculpatory DNA evidence. But there may be a dark side to
the authors' attempt to lead America to the altar of genetic acid.' 7 This dark
side has two principal aspects. First, the overemphasis on DNA evidence
might lead the public to assume that once DNA testing is provided, the
other policy proposals the authors offer are unneeded. Second,
overemphasizing DNA could, if taken to its logical extreme, be used to
undermine traditional constitutional liberties.
The first problem with emphasizing DNA evidence as a means of
averting wrongful conviction arises from the possibility that the public will
assume that DNA can cure all the procedural defects of America's criminal
justice system. Only a limited number of crimes, however, are likely to
involve DNA evidence. As Edward Lazarus writes, "The universe of cases
where DNA testing can provide such magic-bullet results is very small:
basically, only rape or rape-murder cases, in which the exchange of genetic
material necessarily occurs." " Lazarus neglects to consider that DNA
technology could advance to the point where a stray hair or a flake of dead
skin could provide sufficient material for an identification. Still, the fact
remains that DNA evidence, at the present time, is available for only a
small number of those who might be wrongly convicted.
It is likely that the acquittal stories the authors describe do not portend a
burgeoning trend. 9 Rather, this historical moment is exceptional: In this
decade, for the first time, testing of DNA evidence is possible. For those for
whom DNA testing could make a difference, it probably already has. ° In
15. These include new commissions, tests, blue-ribbon committees, screening committees,
new levels of federal involvement in state prosecutions, performance standards for defense
lawyers, observers of interrogations, taping methods, inspectors general, and regulatory oversight
(pp. 255-60).
16. The authors' emphasis on DNA can be seen both in how they relate their narratives
(passim), and how they present their policy proposals (listing DNA first) (p. 255).
17. The authors are certainly not the only commentators to put their faith in DNA. One court
claimed that DNA evidence might become "the single greatest advance in the 'search for
truth' ... since the advent of cross-examination." People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644
(Albany County Ct. 1988).
18. Edward Lazarus, The Limits of DNA Justice, WASH. POST, June 16, 2000, at A29.
19. The authors recognize this (p. 251). However, they do not admit that from a policy
perspective, as I argue, framing narratives of wrongful conviction around DNA testing might draw
attention from more meaningful reforms. More significantly, they fail to recognize that DNA may
be relevant in only a small percentage of future criminal trials.
20. There are no doubt some incarcerated persons who have not received DNA testing. For
most inmates for whom additional, nongenetic evidence casts doubt on their guilt, however,
projects like the one led by the authors have probably already provided DNA testing.
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the future, DNA testing may help avoid wrongful convictions, but it is not
likely to help free the wrongfully convicted.
Telling these stories and concentrating on the role of DNA in freeing
the wrongly convicted draws attention to DNA, but possibly at the cost of
distracting policymakers from other necessary reforms of the justice
system. The media furor over acquittals of death row convicts generated a
number of DNA-testing-related bills in Congress this year.2 No similar
bills were generated concerning jailhouse snitches or junk science. As
Edward Lazarus concluded, "It would be a tragic irony if DNA testing,
having shown that innocent people do get convicted, becomes a ploy by
which politicians feign concern while ignoring the vast majority of persons
with evidence of innocence-those for whom DNA testing is no help at
all." 22 This is of course not the aim of the authors of Actual Innocence. But
their approach-emphasizing above all the power of DNA testing-may
contribute to such political ploys.
A more dangerous consequence of focusing the public's attention on
DNA evidence relates directly to the authors' concern for averting wrongful
convictions. Drawn from the public, juries may come to overvalue DNA
evidence to convict defendants not indicted by other evidence. After all, in
most cases all DNA evidence can show is that a defendant had contact with
a victim. Works that, like Actual Innocence, praise the power of DNA may
inadvertently encourage juries to neglect other sources of exonerating
evidence when DNA evidence favors conviction. Moreover, when juries
place excessive faith in DNA, they make it more likely that planted
evidence, corrupt DNA labs, and lab error could lead to unjust conviction.
This "reverse-O.J." 23 problem cautions against singing DNA's praises too
loudly.
The second danger of overemphasizing the role of DNA in freeing the
unjustly convicted, from a civil libertarian perspective, is that DNA testing
could actually provide the basis for reducing procedural protections for
criminal suspects. A growing movement is afoot in the legal academy to
end or at least "flexify" 24 the Fourth Amendment's requirement that police
21. Helen Dewar, Support Grows for Execution Safeguards: Exonerations Spur Bills in
Congress, WASH. POST, June 16, 2000, at Al.
22. Lazarus, supra note 18.
23. As most readers no doubt know, in the O.J. Simpson case, the jurors' doubts about DNA
labs and belief that evidence had been planted led to the defendant's acquittal. See generally
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE RUN OF HIS LIFE: THE PEOPLE V. O.J, SIMPSON (1996). In the scenario I
describe, jurors' excessive faith in DNA makes it more likely that a defendant will be convicted
on the basis of planted evidence and flawed labs.
24. Professor Christopher Slobogin argues that "probable cause to search should not be
conceptualized as a fixed quantity of certainty but rather, as is already the case with suspicion
requirements associated with seizures, should be varied according to the level of intrusion
involved." Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1038, 1057 (1996) [hereinafter Slobogin, Testilying]; see also Christopher
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obtain search warrants backed up by probable cause before searching the
property of suspects.' Under the so-called exclusionary rule established by
the Supreme Court, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
is inadmissible.26 While the Supreme Court has called for a commonsense
view of the probable cause requirement, 27 other courts have resisted
modification of the exclusionary rule.2"
The anti-Fourth Amendment camp could make an argument that
wrongful conviction can be avoided by reducing procedural protections
against search and seizure so as to maximize the chances that police
promptly gather all available genetic evidence.29 Such an argument would
begin something like this: Procedure means delay. After targeting a
particular suspect, police officers have to set out to acquire enough probable
cause to sustain a search warrant.
In the post-DNA world of criminal justice, it could be said, time
matters. With time, DNA, like blood-marker proteins (p. 30), breaks
down.3" DNA gathered at a crime scene may be insufficient for
identification purposes, which is why searching a suspect's property and
possessions matters: "[I]n the messy reality of crime scenes, DNA is a
scarce commodity" (p. 36). In the Marion Coakley case described by the
Slobogin, The World Without the Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1, 68-75 (1996) (arguing
at greater length that Fourth Amendment standards should be more flexible).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (" [N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation .... ).
26. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
27. E.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981) (stating that probable cause "does
not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. .. [and] common-sense conclusions about
human behavior").
28. See, e.g., People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983) (ruling that observation of a
stranger in a neighborhood trying to hitch a ride with his shirt draped over a TV and wool gloves
in his back pocket, an hour after he was seen peering into two houses, was not probable cause).
29. Slobogin, the dean of the anti-Fourth Amendment school, has already argued that the
Fourth Amendment increases the likelihood of wrongful conviction by creating a culture of lying
among police officers. Slobogin, Testilying, supra note 24, at 1057. Slobogin argues that the
probable-cause requirement exerts ex post pressure on police to lie in support of questionable
searches, stating, "Lying intended to convict the guilty-in particular, lying to evade the
consequences of the exclusionary rule-is so common and so accepted in some jurisdictions that
the police themselves have come up with a name for it: 'testilying."' Id. at 1040. Once lying to
convict the clearly guilty becomes acceptable, Slobogin argues, lying to convict the probably
guilty could easily become commonplace. In a culture where police are permitted if not
encouraged to lie, some more zealous officers may even be led to frame suspects who are not
clearly guilty. One scholar has argued that Slobogin's proposal is already the reality in American
courtrooms-that is, that the Fourth Amendment means nothing in serious crimes. Steven Duke,
Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1408 n.33 (1986) (arguing that the exclusionary rule
simply does not apply in serious crimes).
30. Technically, heat, not time, causes DNA molecules to denature. Time increases the
likelihood, however, that DNA molecules will be exposed to heat and ultraviolet light and thus
begin to break down. See L. McNally et al., Evaluation of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Isolated
from Human Bloodstains Exposed to Ultraviolet Light, Heat, Humidity, and Soil Contamination,
34 J. FoRENSIC SCl. 1059 (1989) (reporting that studies show heat, ultraviolet light, humidity, and
soil contamination can work to degrade a DNA sample).
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authors, DNA evidence was destroyed by initial lab tests (p. 24). The
Fourth Amendment causes delay, which means that DNA evidence in a
suspect's possession that could exonerate him might never be recovered.3
However, one could counter that a Fourth Amendment-induced delay (of,
say, twenty-four hours) would not lead to the destruction of evidence that
would not have been destroyed in the first few hours. Thus, the Fourth
Amendment might not bring about any marginal loss in DNA evidence.
Alternatively, DNA that could conclusively prove the guilt of one of
several suspects might be lost, and the police could thus end up pursuing
the wrong suspect. Broader sweeps early in an investigation could recover
DNA evidence from individuals not yet targeted by the police, but the
Fourth Amendment makes such broad sweeps difficult or impossible.
Moreover, the requirement of probable cause for arrests and searches
necessitates that police officers focus on witness identification and
informants-which the authors rightly portray as prone to facilitate
injustice-rather than on gathering reliable DNA evidence, since to get a
warrant in the first place police need evidence along the lines of witness
testimony or a tip from a "confidential informant," in the parlance of the
business. Paraphrasing the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in United States
v. Wade,32 the authors note that "[o]nce a sympathetic witness identifies a
suspect, .. . investigation ends for nearly all intents and purposes" (p. 74).
The anti-Fourth Amendment camp could argue that reducing the
requirement of probable cause would reduce the need on the part of law
enforcers for such unreliable sources, enabling them to concentrate their
efforts on obtaining the most accurate evidence, DNA.
"Flexification" could take several forms. First, because DNA evidence
is so powerful, Fourth Amendment protections could be relaxed for all
citizens, facilitating maximum accumulation of genetic evidence. The
problem with this approach is that there is no way to know ex ante who has
DNA evidence and who does not, so everyone would be susceptible to all
searches. The danger is that a search for DNA might produce non-DNA
evidence of other crimes, and thus eviscerate the Fourth Amendment's
privacy protection. There is really no difference, then, between this DNA-
driven attack on the Fourth Amendment and one based on any other type of
31. Consider the following scenario: A witness sees a man running from the scene of a crime
with a bloody shirt. The Fourth Amendment warrant process delays a search of the suspect's
home, and in that time the blood evidence is gone, but the eyewitness is still able to testify about
the fact that the suspect was covered with blood. DNA testing would have demonstrated
definitively that the blood the witness saw was not the victim's. A more obvious case would be
one in which DNA evidence was not destroyed but simply obscured to the point where only an
inexact DNA test was possible. As a result, DNA which would not have matched could be
identified as being a possible match.
32. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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evidence. There are costs and benefits to the Fourth Amendment, and DNA
does not substantially affect the balance.
A more modest approach would be to relax Fourth Amendment
protections only for suspects. Such suspects might otherwise be convicted
despite being innocent without the discovery of exonerating DNA evidence
(which is arguably imperiled by procedural delays). This approach, too, is
problematic. Again, there is no way of knowing which suspects have
exonerating DNA eVidence, so the Fourth Amendment rights of all suspects
would have to be breached. This could be a backdoor approach to
eliminating the Constitution's privacy guarantee. The universe of scenarios
in which this would help a suspect is also quite restricted.33 Crime scene
evidence, after all, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, and a
suspect's own DNA is not at risk of disappearing. On balance, the social
costs of reducing privacy rights probably do not outweigh the gains
resulting from a minute diminution in the rate of wrongful conviction.
On the other hand, one could assert that the moral implications of even
a single wrongful conviction are more troubling than wholesale
deprivations of privacy rights. Assuming that the value consequences of
wrongful conviction trump those of privacy deprivation, the anti-Fourth
Amendment argument based on DNA suddenly becomes plausible.
Political scientists34 and science-fiction filmmakers35 have envisioned a
world where genetic and other forms of technology favor (and are favored
by) anti-liberty regimes. The Supreme Court might never be tempted to
flexify further the Fourth Amendment out of a concern for stare decisis. 6
Or the Court might appreciate that the examples discussed above37 are not
frequent enough to justify an across-the-board breach of the Fourth
Amendment rights of all suspects, much less all citizens. Still, whenever a
line of argument has the potential to restrict constitutional liberties, it
should be considered carefully.
-Geoffrey Christopher Rapp
33. For a few plausible examples, see supra note 31.
34. Political scientists have speculated that dictatorships could thrive if technology reduced
their tendency to punish arbitrarily (that is, for reasons unrelated to the truth of guilt or
innocence). Cf SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 294 (1991) (speculating that a "technocratic electronic dictatorship" could
thrive in the future).
35. For example, in the film Gattaca, society accepts utterly invasive criminal investigation,
confident that advanced genetic testing will help ascertain the guilt or innocence of suspected
criminals. GATTACA (Sony 1997).
36. Witness the Court's recent refusal to abandon Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
largely on stare decisis grounds. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
37. Supra note 31.
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